

Address By

MAJOR GENERAL
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Chief of O.S.S. — World War II

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AT THE
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TODAY THE AMERICAN NAVY has the responsibility and the burden which the British Navy had for a century and a half.

We Americans are inclined to believe that the oceans are a barrier and a defense. In reality America is accessible from the sea which provides the avenues for invasions and for offensive action.

What protects the United States is not the sea but the Navy on it—with its marines, its aviation, and its Naval Reserves. To command the sea, to keep open the sea lanes, the Navy must have support from our nation's industrial plants, its factories, its seaports and its defenses.

I am sure that Naval officers would be the first to deny that a Navy could win a major war unaided. No single service is going to win a war without aid. Sea power can do its best job when, together with all of our armed services, it is part of a unified team. It is well for us to keep in mind in our discussions about Korea that it is only our possession of a Navy and its command of the sea that we are able to keep troops in Korea at all.

Besides transporting the bulk of the Eighth Army with equipment and supplies to the battle area, and supporting it immediately after it went into battle service ever since, the Navy has accomplished two major feats of arms:

(1) the amphibious landing at Inchon which completely broke the back of the Communist offense at that point; and

(2) the withdrawal of the Tenth Corps at Hungnam which averted what might have been a real military disaster. Such disasters as occurred in the escape from Dunkirk, the British evacuation of Greece in World War II and the fate suffered by Rommel's Army cornered in Tunis, could not be taken off by the Axis navies.

Thanks to the courtesy of Secretary Kimball, it was my privilege a few months ago to visit Korea and see for myself the gallantry and sustained courage of our marines and our infantry. Those of you here who were in World War I and remember the fixed positions and stabilized warfare of those days, can visualize the incessant night raids and constant artillery fire in that area. I saw there two of the operations of our Air Force in its support of advancing troops and in its pounding of the Red supply lines.

There also were the operations of the fast carrier task forces operating off Korea in all kinds of weather, at the end of a very long supply line. Employing at most three carriers, they have according to figures issued by the Chief of Naval Operations supplied 40% of the air effort which has been directed at the Communists in Korea. It was very heartening to see the teamwork of these services. We ask ourselves what has the Navy done between World War II and the present to prepare for its orthodox missions? I have learned that it has instituted and vigorously worked on a program of scientific development. It has concentrated in the fields of anti-submarine warfare, offensive action through the use of its carrier air power and the development of guided missiles for fleet defense.

Stalin, too, has recognized that the world is in a new age of technology which has revolutionized atomic jet and electronic armaments. He appreciates, too, I am sure, that a direct result of that technological revolution is the capacity of nuclear

energy for movement and for destruction. But in developing these weapons, the Soviets have not, as we have, ignored and neglected the use of new devices in the art of irregular warfare and in the war of maneuver by psychological means.

Our orthodox military forces are confronted then with the fact that the Soviets have two strings to their bow—the conventional where they meet us toe to toe and in the psychological field of war where we are nearly helpless.

The Navy which for our country has shown its diplomatic and political, as well as its fighting talents, should recognize the possibilities of this field of warfare.

The Mediterranean particularly the Adriatic, Aegean and Western Mediterranean are ideally configured for covert operations from small boats and submarines. It is not unlike Sweden whose Navy, Hanson Baldwin tells us, has gone underground on the Baltic coast to counter the Soviet threat.

Surely the Navy—which landed many OSS raiding parties on enemy coasts and many if not most of whose “frogmen” were OSS-trained—could be of great value in the war now being waged against us by the Soviet Union.

And the need for this kind of warfare becomes more pressing. We are only beginning to realize that when we try to contain an enemy our initiative is destroyed and we run the danger of being overrun by the forces we try to contain.

Stalin's speech to the closing Session of the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party a few days ago was merely a restatement of a basic principle of Soviet policy. There is nothing new in this. It means only that whatever adjective is used—“cold”, “hot”, “shooting”—that Stalin will continue by propaganda, subversion and division of peoples, including our own country, to seek to break our will to resist.

Let's face it: This country is at war with the Soviet Union today, and it is time we stopped talking about a "cold war" that is no more cold than the "phony war" of 1939 was phony. This is subversive war and if we win we will have the edge in a shooting war. If we win, we can prevent World War III.

We have failed to recognize this war because it is an un-orthodox war. While we continue to play by the Marquis of Queensberry rules, the Soviets ignore all rules. While we build up our strength, the Soviets seize strategic areas by subversive means. It is a form of irregular warfare. A kind of war that has been waged since ancient times. The Byzantine army boasted of their skill in stratagems and craftiness.

The British and French used its methods here in North America in Colonial days. General George Washington displayed exceptional skill in deceiving the enemy and employing secret agents to obtain information in our Revolutionary War. This kind of war is called by different names: irregular, subversive, psychological. Like orthodox warfare, it seeks to break the will of an enemy to resist by all means moral and physical—and it is still war.

Hitler and Mussolini developed subversive and psychological methods, modernized propaganda and fifth column activities, but used them only to support their orthodox armies. The Nazis had only small groups of supporters in the democratic countries and their espionage operations were limited, but the Soviets make use of the fifth column and the Communist Party as an army of occupation!

But Stalin has perfected these techniques: In each target country, operations are directed by Moscow-trained leaders with a small but strategically well placed hard core Communist minority, ready to engage in sabotage and in partisan warfare.

They infiltrate a target country, win a foothold in the channels of public information and seek to control the key labor unions, penetrate government agencies and establish popular fronts. There are no declarations of war, no troops, no tanks, no planes. But this stealthy warfare plus the threat of the Red Army, has given Stalin control over vast areas of territories and hundreds of thousands of people.

We have only just begun to grasp the special nature of Communist organization and methods. The real strength of the Soviets lies in their world-wide organization, highly developed techniques and communications, and in the discipline of leaders especially trained in the Lenin School in Moscow.

Only by our understanding of the manner in which the fight is carried to us will we be able to deal with it. We can't sit back and hope to be let alone. There is no place for complacency, or indifference, or fear—we can't buy our way out, nor should we be misled by seeming successes until we have totaled the score on a global scale.

So far, our efforts to counter Soviet subversive war have been piecemeal. We helped Greece stop Tito and Stalin in the so-called civil war. Our Berlin airlift forced the Soviets to quit their blockade. From a standing start, we have held their proxies in Korea. But we have not gone all-out. We can do this if we make a fist of all our resources—propaganda, deception, ideology, sabotage, guerrilla tactics and military and economic help—so that every blow is a real punch!

And we did exactly this in World War II. From France to China, through such operations, the Office of Strategic Services gained for us the experience, the skill and the knowledge we now need. They are not just theories—they are things we have done with profit and can do again.

Take the job that faces us in China. We must stop Stalin and his attempted consolidation—now. His conquest of China was a major defeat for our country. It made the Soviet Union the dominant power in Asia as it is in Europe. Once Asia is secured for the Kremlin, the Communist forces can be turned against Europe and America. It is a big, tough, complex job to upset that timetable, but it is our job and the outcome is life or death for America!

The manpower for that job can come from those countries whose forces could be American-trained and equipped. We must ask the question in Asia that we asked in Europe. Are you Asians prepared to fight for your own liberties? I believe with the proper exercise of our leadership, we can obtain the confidence of those Chinese who are prepared to take up the fight against Mao. We must realize that this is a two-ocean war. In the interest of common defense, we are obliged to work with the Asians as well as with the Europeans. The South Koreans, trained by American officers have shown their quality in the recent fighting in Korea. The real task in Korea is to have a diversion by way of China—a diversion that can take some of the weight off our backs. That will take time and sustained effort.

But we know how to help people like the Chinese. In World War II we achieved similar results in North China, right up to the border of Tibet. We did it in North Burma. There, we armed and equipped Kachin and Karen tribes to fight, harass and delay Japanese troops of occupation. To do this, we sent in specially trained Americans skilled in communications, sabotage and secret intelligence. They operated behind Japanese lines and to support the tribal forces in Burma, we set up headquarters in Assam, on the Burma-India border. These Americans built up a native force of 12,000 fighting men,

kept them in operation and held them loyal to us throughout the war. We did it then and we can do it again.

The Chinese problem that faces us is not identical with the job we did in Burma, but our methods are flexible. In World War II, the Japanese had overrun Siam and it was essential that we establish sources of information in the heart of that country which has such a strategic position in Southeast Asia. At the request of the Siamese government we trained 40 Siamese in America in the various techniques of guerrilla warfare, dropped them with 40 Americans behind the Japanese lines into Siam and from them gathered priceless information of enemy intention. The Siamese Prime Minister was skilled in this kind of warfare. He pretended to be pro-Japanese but was really on our side. In his own palace he gave shelter and protection for two OSS men and set up a radio transmitter by which they reported.

In every trouble spot the details of our problem were different—Indonesia, Indo-China, Greece, Norway, Yugoslavia, Italy and the rest. But in essentials the objectives were always the same.

Now America's objective is—to prevent Stalin from consolidating his gains in the Far East.

You don't measure the success of subversive warfare in terms of battles won and cities destroyed. You don't hope to meet and defeat a powerful enemy in the field. In guerrilla war the object is delay—the tactic hit and run—the targets the small enemy forces, the weak convoy—to breed in the mind of the individual enemy, the sense of isolation and the fear of capture.

Stalin's project is to extend his conquest of China throughout Southeast Asia, down the path the Japanese followed through

Indo-China, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Siam, Malaya, Indonesia and Burma—all the way to India. Six hundred million people—a quarter of all humanity—live in Southeast Asia between India and Australia. This whole vast area is a single unit, a single theatre of war.

Our immediate job is to bolster the countries on China's rim, to reveal the Kremlin's aims for what they are, to assure their peoples that they have not been left alone, to convince them that we do not oppose their awakening nationalism and to show them that their real and present danger is Soviet Imperialism. Our task is not only to provide the weapons of war where that can be done, but the constructive, humanitarian aid that no one else in the world—certainly not Marshal Mao—can give them: medicines, for example, and education in the cure of tropical disease. That is Point Four not in lofty aspirations for the future, but in terms of the present practical need for a pair of pants, a bowl of rice and a chance for a healthy body. These things too are a part of psychological warfare.

And while we instruct them in the cure of their ills, we can teach them to defend themselves. We can bring them tough guerrilla fighters to teach them tough guerrilla fighting. We can provide the equipment, the arms, the radios, the printing presses, the teachers of new methods in industry, farming and schooling. Without these, plans and blueprints will be wasted.

Today, while we sweat here to build up an orthodox fighting force, his agents seize strategic areas necessary to our defense.

Asia is one problem, pressing and immediate, but Asia is not all. The unorthodox war must be fought simultaneously in Europe on three levels: in the countries that stand in the Kremlin's path of expansion, in the satellite countries already enslaved, and inside the Soviet Union itself. And in all those

categories, though the methods of fighting vary, the goal of the subversive war is the same: to prevent expansion and consolidation by the Soviet; to give moral and physical support to our allies and to keep the enemy off balance until we are strong enough to enforce the peace with orthodox military might.

This kind of war is a brave man's war and a poor man's war. It doesn't cost billions and it doesn't fill very large cemeteries, but its results can be incalculable. We can put our people into countries behind the Iron Curtain, but we can't equip armies there and we can't arouse peoples to revolt when they have no weapons. But we can foment unrest, discontent—and sustain hope.

The purges in Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are certain signs that the Kremlin fears those peoples have been dangerously aroused. In those places we have a very real chance for success, if we use the methods experience has taught us will make for success.

When Hitler wanted an agent, in say, Czechoslovakia, he had to buy a traitor. All we had to do was to find a patriot and give him a gun. During the war some French and British thought it was a dangerous liability that we have so many minority groups in America. We showed them that it was an asset. Americans of the racial origin and the language of the countries we sought to liberate helped build armies of resistance in those countries.

We learned another odd thing—that it's easier to reach and help people in an occupied country when they have been conscripted into the enemy's army than it is to reach those who have gone underground. It works like this: the patriot drafted into an invader's army is a patriot still; he is a source of information and even of arms to the underground forces.

Getting at the inside of the Soviet Union is a different matter. We know the Russian people want to reach the peoples on our side of the curtain. There is not yet enough strength and will for insurrection but there are tides of resentment and discontent. There are many Russians who would be glad to escape from the rule of the Kremlin and some who have done so have been willing to go back. Those are the ones who can tell their friends what is happening in the world outside Russia and how real our support of assistance would be. We made a serious mistake at the end of the war by receiving people who had escaped and sending them back under guard to concentration camps and death at the hands of the Kremlin. Part of our job is to convince the Russian people that they do have a chance in the world and we are with them.

We are with them and against their masters even to the point of unloading our whole store of atomic bombs where they will do the most good. It is fear of our bombs that has kept Stalin from total war so far, but he too is stockpiling bombs and there may come a time when he will feel that the odds against him have shortened. What he cannot shake off is the continuing fear of his own people. It is appropriate here to quote the Italian historian, Guglielmo Ferrero:

“Power is condemned to live in terror because, in order to govern, it employs violence and terror. Its subjects fear the arbitrary power which they must obey, while the power itself fears the subjects it commands It is the fear inherent in power, fear of revolt, a fear which from the very outset seizes upon all power that is founded on force”

That fear rests heavily upon the Kremlin and we can use it. We can turn the Soviet against itself. By helping his own

people to help themselves we can magnify Stalin's fear, give truth and force to his nightmare and in the end prevent him from reaching his goal of world domination.

We see the Soviet's effort to seize the Middle East not by open war but by subversion. Iran lies right across our sea and air lines of communication with the Eastern Hemisphere. It is the bridge between Asia and Africa. If the Kremlin controlled Iran it would control not only Iran's oil but it would very nearly control access to Africa and India. There can be no argument about the necessity of safeguarding British bases in the Middle East and our own interests in Saudi Arabia. The Soviet threat to India must be arrested if she is to remain a bulwark of freedom in Asia, and order must be restored in Burma. Otherwise, we would stand stripped and alone in the East. It is gallant to fight alone, but it is more gallant still, and more prudent to fight beside allies.

We can't get out of Korea because we're too far in. And if we think of a future we won't get out. We have begun slowly to realize that we will have to help those forces of Asia who recognize Stalin for what he is and who are prepared to fight for the liberation of China from foreign domination.

We have the machinery for a comprehensive psychological war, most of it scattered through various departments of the government, but the whole task is not coordinated. These various agencies must be pulled together under central direction so that the Kremlin can be hit with all we've got.

There are people who are afraid any positive action we take would scare Stalin into World War III. They ought to know that if Stalin is determined to make war on the United States he will do so, no matter what we do. Meantime, unless we fight him with his own weapons, he will continue to cajole and

maneuver us out of position, seize the bases we might one day need, and reduce us to a level he could attack at his own time and place.

This is our time of danger. Now, mobilizing our forces and manufacturing our weapons, we stand where England stood after Dunkirk, with her army in Libya and her home front racing to arm and defend the nation.

We know the Soviet intentions. We have seen the pattern of the Soviet tactics. We have come to understand the significance of the Soviet type of war by indirection.

Psychological warfare is here to stay for the duration and the sooner we recognize it, the better off we'll be. Anything this nation must do it can do.

We are at war with an enemy who is alert, tenacious and ruthless. His objective is world empire.

We must be as alert, as tenacious, as ruthless, for *our* objective is to live as free men.